The Mechanism Of Manager Stock Ownership Incentive And Its Emprimental Study In Zhejiang Province

Manager incentive is not only a topical proposition which is noticed widely in the theoretical circle but also a practical problem which the circle of industry and commerce is trying to probe into. There are a lot of questions about manager incentive which are worth studying. Whether the enterprises in China can stand firmly in the international competition in the face of the challenge of the economic globalization depends chiefly on the enterprise's capability for competing. Whether an enterprise has a great capability for competing is concerned with many factors among which the quality and quantity of Idiosyncratic Human Capital is the most important one. In the contemporary enterprises where proprietary right is separated from managing right, managers regarded as the rare entity of Idiosyncratic Human Capital are the most important factor as to the deciding of the enterprise's accomplishments and the improvement of the capability for competing. The effect of human capital can be seen only through incentive. However, the traditional incentive in China which is mainly composed of short-term incentive, lacks systematisation and has a lot of side-effects often brings about the phenomena such as the manager's short-term action, insider control and so on.The puzzle—the absence of long-term incentive has become one of the obstacles which trouble the enterprises in China. Therefore, the study of the manager's long-term incentive system is an urgent task which confronts the enterprises in China. It has important theoretical and practical significance.Stock ownership incentive which is widely used in the overseas corporate enterprises and has an obvious effect is one of the means of long-term incentive which the western developed nations have come up with. Many enterprises in China have used the overseas experience forreference and tried out the system of stock ownership incentive, but the effect is not very obvious. Why? There are two important puzzles. The first one is that experiental study is often used to study the achievements of stock ownership incentive overseas; there are a lot of differences between the samples; the proper analyses of mathematical model are rare; the achievements of stock ownership incentive overseas are not very useful to the enterprises in China which have a different system background and structure of management. Most of the domestic studies of stock ownership incentive whose solutionsand sugestions lack the manageable feature don't have the content about the practical exploration of the enteiprises in the specific areas, and their contents are very empty. Because of this, the paper deals with the issue in two original ways. The first one is using the means of Game theoiy to carry out the proper analysis and improve its the scientific feature and the feature of being suitable. The second one is using the superiority of the private enterprise in Zhejiang province to carry out the practical study of the system of stock ownership incentive, explore the move orbit of its indigenization and regionalization and improve its practical effect and manageable feature.This essay begins with the definition comparison between manager stock ownership incentive, and make an exposition about the significance of stock ownership incentive. This essay also takes a reference about the recent research essays at home and abroad, using the game theory to analyze the mechanism of stock ownership incentive degrees and applied conditions. Meanwhile, this essay analyzes the relationship between the holding share rates of listed companies in Zhengjiang province and the performance that companies make. Finally, this essay puts forward the specific ways and plan implementation to strengthen manager stock ownership incentive in listed companies in Zhengjiang province.This essay establishes a multi-stage dynamic game model of...