Research On The Corporate Governance Model Of Chinese Family Business In Southeast Asia

Family firms play a very important role in economic development of many countries in the world; however, it has attracted only little attention in the past, especially the Chinese family firms. The corporate governance model of the Chinese family firms has much difference to the Equity Market-Based corporate governance system (EMS), such as enterprises in U.S.A. and U.K., and the Bank-Led corporate governance system (BLS), such as enterprises in Germany and Japan. They deserve to much more attention. This dissertation aims to contribute to research on family firm governance. By summarizing some phenomena of Chinese family firms in Southeast Asia, referring to other scholars' research, the paper induces Southeast Asian Chinese family firm governance model to three characteristics, including highly combining of ownership and control, paternalism, relational network governance. The paper analyses three characteristics and the internal factors, and explains the strong and weak points. The strong points include clear property right, low transaction cost, low proxy and supervising cost and so on. The weak points include that family governance limits finance channel, paternalism may lead to centralization and dictatorial leadership, and that relational network governance has bad influence on system building and management. In the last part, the paper investigates the evolution trend of Southeast Asian Chinese family business, based on the analysis of the change reasons of governance system. The paper points out that there is a trend that operation and management right is separating from control, equity right become more socialized and public, and that paternalism is improving, system management is being strengthened.