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Economical Analysis Of Environmental Public Interest Litigation

Posted on:2008-10-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:C Q YangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2166360212993973Subject:Law
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Environment is typical public goods. Its characteristics determine that we should not protect environment by the way of protecting separate property, or, nobody would try his best to eliminate the pollution. From the point of the Game Theory, the reason is that everybody does nothing is the best choice. According to the margin income of public goods amounts null and margin income equals to price, the common goods can but be supplied by the government. From the traditional economic viewpoint the environmental externalities could be resolved by "Pigovian tax". But in fact the government is low efficient in supplying the common goods and the "rent seeking" is ubiquitous in the domain of government deeds. The hypothesis of "Economic Man" has been introduced into the political market place from the area of commodities. In solving environmental pollution, the environmental public interest litigation system is very necessary to construct.The first part is concerned with the conception of public interest and the environmental public interest litigation. The public interest is difficult to define, because it is about many people' interest. According to Arrow' impossibility the preference of individual is impossible to mass the preference of the collectivity. The article points that the public interest is incarnated by the common goods. At last, it is concerned with the succinct explain of the conception of the environment public interest litigation.The second part is about the feasibility of the economic analysis of law and the environmental right of the citizen under the theory of Coase. Just as Coase Theorem said the right is not endowed deservedly. It must be under the utility maximization. When the pollution is efficient, the right must be endowed to the corporation in the way of pollution license. The others are the citizens' rights. At last the article points that there exist enormous transaction costs between the citizens and the corporations when they exchange the sanitary environment. So, the environment right of the citizen should be protected by the way of liability rule.The third part is concerned with the different standings and the different economic reasons. In the traditional administrative procedure law, the citizen could prosecute only when the administrative deeds aggrieve the private interest. The citizens do nothing for the good of the public interest, because the government is the "perfect" core in vindicate the public interest. As the amendment of the economics, the economist realized the government's localization in dealing with the environment's pollution and the "rent-seeking" which lead to the huge waste of resource. From the analysis between Lujan's "injury in fact" and Laidlaw's "injury in fiction", the author fingers that the standing of the citizen suits should be insist on the former one. At last the article introduces the restrictive qualifications of the citizen suits and analyzes its disadvantages.The forth part is that the citizen, the organization of environmental protection and the Procuratorial organs could prosecute. Because of the "free-rider" and the "dissipation of rent" under the excess recompense, the citizen must be compensated which amount to the cost of the litigation. In addition the organization of environmental protection and the Procuratorial organs is the better choice in the litigation because they agglomerate more individual preference. But, from the viewpoint of the efficiency, we cannot find the reason for the Procuratorial organs to prosecute. At last, the article discusses that in the litigation of environment public interest the due process should be moderate.The analysis of the article is under the efficiency, sometimes, the justice is omitted. Somebody said the efficiency embodies the justice. Somebody said justice is windy, but efficiency is genuine. In my opinion, just as the Newton Law—the uniform motion is in the hypothesis of non-friction and the Coase Theorem—the right firstly collocated is not a big deal when the "transaction costs" is null.We could omit the justice provisionally when it is difficult to define. The efficiency is the first step to lead to the perfection of the law.
Keywords/Search Tags:environmental public interest litigation, standing to sue, the economic analysis of law, Coase Theorem
PDF Full Text Request
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