The Institutional Economics Analysis On Administrative Litigation

With the dissatisfaction on the traditional demonstration based on the value of justice that holds the necessity and rationality on the enlargement of the scope of case acceptance of administrative litigation, the writer analyse the administrative litigation through institutional economics way. Institutional economics verifies the meaning of institution by the way of generalizing the concepts of property right, transaction, and transaction cost, which means the allocation of the limited resources involved with property right is the subject of institutional economics. Through analysis, we find that court set up by the administrative litigation system is a place of reallocating resources. Therefore, administrative litigation is a system of reallocating limited resources which is the subject of institutional economics.With the premise of efficiency value subordinating to legal ethics system, the institutional economics highlights the objectivity, uniformity, accuracy, certainty of the efficiency value, which provides a more scientific criterion for analyzing the system.. To prove the enlargement of the scope of case acceptance of administrative litigation is a better system, we should hold the institutional economics view that takes the function of system as a economic rational criterion of reallocating transaction cost and evaluates which cost saving designed by the system is more likely to realize the reallocation, the enlargement of the scope of case acceptance of administrative litigation is a more efficient system.In the context of institutional economics, the purpose of the system of administrative litigation has been recognized as a dynamic allocative efficiency of reach. The essential of administrative litigation system is to reallocate the resources and the property right which was resulted in low efficiency by misconducts, to remedy the indeficient information sharing status in the framework of law, to return the property rights which were deprived from the counterpart originally belonged to by misconducts and would exert greater value if the property right were held by the counterpart to the counterpart or return the property rights which were illegally occupied by the counterpart to the administrative organs that would make greater value for the public benefit and to create greater effectiveness for the increase of social fortune.Therefore, the ideal system of administrative litigation is reformed under the guidance of allocative efficiency and limited rational reconstruction. This is a system which is able to provide a stable expectations, both for the government and the counterpart, with equal status and the possibility of transaction, at the same time rational and humble attitude to protect the efficiency of the transaction system. In other words, in an ideal system of administrative litigation, administrative proceedings successfully provide a trading market to the government and the counterpart. Under the market, the judicial power and the executive power have a flexible boundary, the court force to make decisions only when a efficiency deal cannot be reached between both sides. We should be promoting the reform in the direction of the ideal administrative proceedings.However, the ideal system of administrative litigation has its limitations, which to some extent, beyond the status quo of China's administrative proceedings. Therefore, we the problem through the analysis of voluntary transactions, the agent's moral hazard problem, as well as changes in the history of accidental system problems, to reflect on the limitations of using institutional economics to study the system of administrative litigation, administrative proceedings to further explore the direction of reform.