Analytical: Between Ordinary And Absurd

In introduction, the importance of analyticity in the history of philosophy and the value for a new discussion is demonstrated clearly. In chapter two, the positive work of defining analyticity, from Leibniz to logical positivism, is reviewed chronologically. After that, Quine’s three-fold critic to this concept is examined. In face of this long-lasting debate, Gillian Russell puts forward a strategy, i.e., firstly the conceptual analysis concerning’in virtue of is needed; secondly’meaning myth’ should be separated into four components. Russell believes that, if analyticity was characterized as’Truth in virtue of meaning’, this work would make it clear what this characterization means. After picking out the reference determiner from the meaning myth, Russell defines a new version of analyticity. With her definition in mind, the role analyticity plays in epistemological justification is then scrutinized in chapter four. This task is performed with a comparison with’theory of triviality’and’theory of absurdity’. The former one stands for the view which is advocated, primarily, by Logical positivists. They admit that knowledge justified by analyticity is trivial regardless of its being metaphysically meaningful. The latter one refers to Quinean camp. They argue that it is absurd and unintelligible, both in metaphysics and epistemology, to defend some knowledge which is immune to empirical revision by appealing to analyticity. From what Russell tells us, it is argued that knowledge justified by her definition is neither trivial nor absurd. It is not trivial in that character and reference determiner is clearly separated in our new definition, thus analytic statement concerning natural kind is in a sense formative. Besides, knowledge justified by analyticity can be factual even though it is initially a linguistic matter. It is not absurd since our speculation on definition, with the help of Frege and Davidson, would support the view that definition, especially semantic stipulation, is in its nature true, and this would in turn mark Quine’s thesis’Definitions as postulates’ as false. Consequently, when the misleading views concerning the role that analyticity plays in justification are exposed and wiped out, it would be still important and reasonable for us to rethink analyticity. A successful revival of analyticity would definitely help us to make a further inspection into a priori truth, the nature of language and our thought.