The Empirical Research Between Chinese Listed Companies' Ownership Structure And Performance

Chinese listed companies are born out of traditional enterprises, especially state-owned enterprise in the transition from the planned economy to the market economy. During the past twenty years we have got some achievements through the innovation, but it is inevitably have some institutional defects that require constant reform in listed companies. It becomes a main problem that listed companies' performance is dissatisfactory because of the irrational ownership structure. Ownership structure is an important part of corporate governance. The different ownership structure will form different corporate governance and a rational ownership can promote the betterment of governance efficiency and increase of performance. For these reasons this thesis choose the relationship between listed companies' ownership structure and their performance to discuss and this analysis is based on Marx's theory of Two Rights Separation and the Principal-Agent theory in western economics. In the course of empirical research this thesis choose four indexes and use spss11.0 software to analyze. CROA is index of performance and L1, DR5 and Herfindahl are indexes of concentration rate of shares. Through the empirical research on all Chinese listed companies this thesis make a conclusion that there is remarkable relativity between ownership structure and performance. The empirical research on three representative shows that there is a rational proportion that the first stockholder hold stocks and the proportion is different for different industry. The result of empirical research also shows that it can effectively improvegovernance efficiency and performance to keep appropriate restrict and equipoise of ownership structure. In the end this thesis make suggestions that listed companies will reduce the state-own share according to characteristic of different industry and adjust concentration rate of shares to improve their performance.