Research Into Listed Company Governance

Mostly listed companies in china are born out of traditional state-owned enterprises, and have developed in the transition from the planned economy to the market economy. In order to keep the control position of state-owned shares, and avoid the losing of state-owned properties, our listed companies equity ownership structure (EOS) showed a distinguishing feature of the partition of liquid and non-liquid shares, under the dominating of state-owned shares. This influences of non-marketization designer are foundermental and basic to listed companies governance .the reasonable structure didn't get a good result in practice, in spite of the law designed thoroughly the internal power system of listed company. The interest conflicts were sharper between owner and manager, as well as dominating shareholders and non-dominating shareholders. So the perfecting of EOS is urgent and necessary.From multiple perspectives such as concentration rate, circulation and equity property, I discuss the relationship between EOS and corporate governance, and by using theoretical analysis and international comparison; I will also bring up suggestion to EOS.This thesis consists of the following six parts:Introduction analyses the problem of our listed companies and points out that we should research the listed companies' governance issue from EOS perspectives.chapter Ⅰ firstly definite the implication of company governance and EOS.Secondly I elaborate the relationship between EOS and corporate governance from three perspectives such as concentration rate, circulation and equity ownership property and also point out that relatively high degree of concentration rate, share well circulating and legal-person holding shares are more perfect under normal circumstances.Chapter Ⅱ mainly analysis the system reason and efficiency of listed company in our country ,1 also introduce the characteristics the EOS of the listed companies in USA, UK, Japan, Germany, some country in southeast-Asian and analyze the difference corporate governance under difference EOS. Lastly I bring up the total train of thoughts to perfect the EOS of listed company: decreasing state-owned share, circulation and legal-person holding shares.Chapter Ⅲ firstly retrospect the reform of decreasing state-owned share and point out the law limitation in procedure and content. Lastly 1 also bring up the law advices about aim, organization and model.Chapter Ⅳ introduces the present program about shares circulation and point out that the four programs such as share shrinkage, shares expand and new shares according new ways, old shares according old ways and shareholders vote according to ownership's character are not conflict. Lastly I analysis the law obstacle of shares circulation and point out we should broad the site of security trading and develop the outer trading market.Chapter Ⅴ explores theoretically the problem of holding stock each other among corporation and stand by the point that we should admit bank holding shares.Perfecting corporate governance is a systematic engineer and need quite institution to cooperate. It doesn't resolve the all problem of corporate governance, although the perfecting of EOS has a fundamental meaning. Because of the limits of time and capacity, I can't discuss some problem such as structure investor, so this is a pity. Meanwhile, the advice having mentioned also need more research, I wish this thesis had an enlightenment role to the later research.