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Management Incentives Of Listed Companies And Alienation Of Accounting Behavior

Posted on:2006-02-15Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:R H ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2179360182470044Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The norm and normal accounting behavior is the foundation of producing true accounting information, which forms the basis of modern market economy and foundation on which the capital market can run well. Among modern enterprises, the existence of incentive contracts is absolutely necessary. Because of the economics meaning and social effect of the agent's compensation, how to design an effective compensation contract to excite the agent's desirable behavior, becomes the key content of incentive contracts. In west, the common way for principals is to combine the accounting income with stock price, in order to make the agent's behavior be kept the same with the principal. However, because of the existence of the information asymmetry, the agent has great chance to manipulate the accounting behavior, thus harm the interests of the stakeholders while maximizing his own utility, intrinsic accounting behavior alienation thus takes place .In our country, because the synthesis management compensation contracts doesn't exist, and the need to control rights for managers themselves has deeper disguise, gives the managers of listed companies great motive to manipulate accounting behavior wantonly. The alienation phenomenon of accounting behavior is very serious, and has done great harm to the security market growth and development.On the basis of reviewing to domestic and international relevant documents, for representatives with the company condemned publicly by the Stock Supervisory Committee in the listed company of our country, Logistically test the influence factor of accounting behavior alienation of listed company in our country, the result shows: The accounting behavior alienation of the listed company has not got effective supervision, as for the supervision of the Stock Supervisory Committee, only big bath behavior , asset-liability ratio of listed company pass significance test. But for the institution arranging with the managers compensation, and so on, does not have remarkable correlation. Finally, in term of the conclusion, which we can work out from the empirical research, we put forward the political suggestion on how to optimize the accounting behavior of listed companies in our country, from the angle of optimizing compensation contracts.The innovation of this text is mainly as follows: we deeply analysis the relation between management incentive and accounting behavior alienation; Through adopting multi-variable Logistic-regression method, we empirically examine the factors which influence the listed company accounting behavior and lead it to be alienation.
Keywords/Search Tags:Incentives, Management compensation contracts, Alienation of accounting behavior
PDF Full Text Request
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