Research For The Transmission, Distinguishing And Quality Control Of Enterprise Financial Information Under Multiple Entrustment-Agency Relationships

With the development of social economy and the coming of the information economic times, the financial information of the enterprise is becoming more and more. Financial information of the enterprise is transmitted between the entrustment and the agency. The phenomenon of asymmetric information is getting more and more severe because of this. It also caused adverse choice and moral venture. This improved the difficulty of quality control on enterprise financial information and influenced its management as well. To the entrustment, it has very important practical significance to know how to reduce or extinguish the disadvantages on financial information and so protect its rights and interests from aggression so as to ensure a healthy and constant development of the enterprise. At present, there are comparatively more theoretical research for the quality control on enterprise financial information. But the researches that are from the angle of multiple entrustment-agency relationships and pay much attention to the practical effects are few.According to the contract theory of the enterprise is a combination of a series of contracts. Financial accounting information in it usually works as the executive variable of the contract. This leads to an interior need to financial information. What' s more, the contract theory provides a pattern to the research for how individual actions related to the enterprise benefits influence financial information. Entrustment-agency theory is actually to concretize the theory of contract combination of the enterprise. In entrustment-agency relationship, on one hand, it' s impossible for the contract clients to get the related information completely due to man' s 'limited senses' and 'opportunism actions' , on the other hand, information is a sort of valuable resource, it can not be offered freely. As a result, entrustment and agency are always in an asymmetric situation of information because it is impossible for the enterprise management mechanism and market mechanism themselves to produce enough information and distribute it efficiently. 'Cheat' and 'Seeking for more benefit' between contract clients will cause some problems of adverse choice and moral venture in their entrustment-agency contract. First of all, this article will introduce to you the mechanism of the financial information transmission of the enterprises. Secondly, it will analyze in details the multiple entrustment-agency relationships in the enterprise and the phenomenon of asymmetric information caused by that, using the theory of entrustment and agency of the enterprise. Thirdly, under the presupposition of asymmetric information, it will do some researches for the transmission, distinguishing and quality control of financial information, combining game theory with practice. In the end, the author will give out some practical cases to do some further inquiries and application.There are two new creative points in this article: the first is to do some quantitative researches on probability of the occurrence of false financial information and the inspecting of the supervisor based on a detailed analysis about the financial information transmission between the entrustment and the agency in the enterprise. The way is to use game theory to establish some models. The second is to point out that the key to solve the problemof asymmetric financial information caused by entrustment-agency relationship in the enterprise is to establish a contract mechanism with both inspiration and restriction. In the meantime, the method of 'Hli achievements and effects test' should also be used to extinguish asymmetric information in making KPI index before the singing of the contract. In this way, the game among all the owners and managers can be turned into 'tri-win' .