The Duality Of Insurance Moral Hazard And Its Prevention And Evasion

The insurance industry in China has been developing very quickly recently. While, the problem of asymmetry information is becoming remarkable in insurance market, especially focuses on moral hazard. At this stage, the insured party's moral hazard is more serious. But with the opening of our insurance market and the aggravation of competition, insurance mediation especially insurance agent and insurance company 's moral hazard behavior turn an upward trend. The forecast studies focus on the insured 's moral hazard, rarely or even neglect the agent and insurance company. However, the asymmetry of information in insurance exchange is not company's patent, the insured party may also in the disadvantage position of information. The agent and insurance company have opportunistic motivation, produce moral hazard quite as much. So what the paper wants to study is the moral hazard problem of the agent and insurance company.Firstly, on the basis of Information Economics and the Theory of Principal-agent, the paper makes general analysis on insurance moral hazard and puts forward "the duality of insurance moral hazard". Then, depicts incorporation of it from the angle of risk underwriter: corporate risk and agent risk. Equally, analyses the nuisance of insurance moral hazard from the macroscopic lay, and boils down to the underlying causes of insurance moral hazard, as the conflict and inconsistency of moral standard and economic criterion, and institutionary source. Next, we survey the agent's moral hazard and its agreement mechanism under the model of multitask principal-agent, and make a conclusion that the fixed ages contract may be better than the inspirited contract. And proceed to bring up a system of agent-employee, which to make parts of undeniableagents to be the personnel of insurance company or exclusive insurance agency. Meanwhile, the paper makes generic analysis of how to decrease the insurance moral hazard.The official system, such as agreement mechanism, has some effects on the prevention and evasion of moral hazard. Simultaneously, informal system, such as relationship, also has nonnegligible auxiliary impacts on preventing and shunning moral hazard. Therefore, in the last part of this article, we proceed from the adaptability of relationship marketing in our country. Through reasoning and reach a conclusion that relationship marketing could do certain work on the prevention and evasion of moral hazard. And then, the author probes into the application of insurance relationship marketing on the aspect of prevention and evasion of moral hazard. This will open up a new angle for studying the problem of moral hazard.