Related-party Transaction And Controlling Shareholder's Tunneling Behavior Of Listed Companies

As a main composing part of securities business, the quality of the listed company is great important to the market's development. After decades of development, our listed company has made great progress in quality and competence, and does benefit to securities market's growth.But we also realize there are still some disadvantages in listed company, such as improper governance structure and the tunneling behavior of the large shareholders by related-party transactions. Especially, the tunneling of the large shareholders has encumbered the management of the listed company and damaged the confidence of the investor. Now the urgent problems which should be solved are how to keep large shareholders' tunneling within limits and make listed company develop healthily and properly.The article consists of five chapters. In the first chapter, the main question is brought forward and the relevant documents are summarized. In second chapter, the definition, character, function and content of the related-party transactions are expatiated. In third chapter, using case-analysis, the means by which the large shareholder expropriates company's asset is demonstrated. By means of comparison and model, the cause for large shareholder's tunneling behavior is analyzed from system rootstock, governance structure and supervision law. In fourth chapter, the hypothesis that the large shareholder expropriates listed company's asset by related-party transactions is validated by using empirical model. In the last chapter, some suggestions, such as strengthening supervision, perfecting the governance structure and introducing into institutional investor are put forward to solve the problem.