Study On The Preference And Performance In The Refinancing Behavior Of Chinese Listed Company

In the late 70's of 20^th century, along with the breakthrough of the economics theory, the introduction of the asymmetry information enabled the financial theory a new leap. It thoroughly changed the authoritative status of MM theory in the financing structure domain. Myers and Majluf (1984) believed that, the internal managers had more information superiority than the exterior investors. Firms will act on the strict Pecking Order (the PO theory) of the internal financial slacks, the secure debt, and the external risky debt when they have to finance funds from the market. The higher the asymmetry information's degree is, the higher the information cost is. The domestic literature believes that the PO theory is a universal suitable result. But it is unusual that Chinese listed companies mostly choose the equity capital to carry on exterior financing. The reason lies in the lower dividends compared to foreign companies greatly reduce the equity financing cost. The equity financing is "free cash" in China.But this behavior that violates the modern finance management, notonly can affect the performance, distort resource allocation, but also can create the negative function to the healthy development of Chinese stock market. The research and the standardization on the financing behavior of listed company, not only is helpful to the stock market, but also enhances the efficiency of resource allocation in entire finance system.Based on the background above, the paper systematically analysis the theory of corporate financing especially concerned about the firm's financial structure and preference. Meanwhile with the foundation of the research on refinancing behavior of listed company, it is proposed of some theoretical viewpoints and suggestions.The whole dissertation includes seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the background, the method and the new ideas. The second summarizes the financing theory, mainly focus on the corporate financing preference and the SEO puzzle. The former lists the MM theorems and the revision, the trade-off theory, the PO theory, the J-M agency cost theory and corporate control theory. The Latter includes the rights offer puzzle and the new issues puzzle. The third chapter uses the massive data, facts to carry on the descriptive analysis on the refinancing behavior of listed company. It is confirmed that the financing preference obviously exists, and the equity financing preference is the basic characteristic. And this part briefly analyzes the influence of the equity capital preference to thecorporate value. The fourth chapter takes the rights offers' companies as the research object, acting the comprehensive analysis on the long-term performance caused by the financing behavior. We discover that these firms performance have the tendency towards long-term deterioration. The fifth chapter exhaustively analyzes the reason of financing preference from the direct cause, exterior cause and the in-depth internal cause. On the foundation of former work, the sixth chapter discusses optimization question of the financing behavior of listed company, so as to produce the countermeasure suggestions. At last the main conclusion of this paper is provided.Zhang PeiYong (Enterprise Management) Supervised by Professor Ge WenLei...