A Study On The Relationship Between The Control Right And Dividend Decision Of The Listed Company Of China

Dividend policy is the extend of the decision of financing and investing .It is important work tostudy on the corporate dividend policy for the west economist .In this article, we take the point ofview on the corporate governance and discuss how to decide the dividend policy in thecompanies which have the controlling shareholders. Moreover, we try to develop agame-theoretic model to further analyze the behaviors of shareholders in such companies. Baseon the special equity capital structure in China, we develop two theoretic models to explain theinternal and external reasons why the controlling shareholders decide the dividend policy.Furthermore, we use the linear and logistic model to demonstrate some conclusions which areconcluded in the two theory models in this article. The demonstration results show that there hasserious benefits conflict between the controlling shareholders and the smaller shareholders. Thecontrolling shareholders always use the corporate control to transfer the smaller shareholders'benefits. Moreover, the first shareholders will send less the cash dividend when they hold themore controlling in the companies.By the explanation of theory and demonstration, we put forward several policy suggestions forthe establishment of structure for corporate control of both efficient and normative in China.Also the conclusion of this paper will give some help to the investors and monitors.