The Studies Of Moral Hazard, Monitoring And Contract Design In Teamwork

While teamwork has been becoming one modern scientific productive way, it has a lot of new own problem, namely unobservablity of every membe's effort and distribution of final output. In reality, output of the whole team is observable, while every member's effort isn't, which causes double-side moral hazard in teamwork. Additionally, distribution of team output is one of team research highlights. Due to moral hazard and issue of distribution in teamwork, unstability or failure is resulted in team finally.Firstly, the paper illustrates teamwork as a modern production way, points its cause and advantage, analyzes its new characters, and indicates its inborn problem-measure of input and distribution of output. Secondly, moral hazard in teamwork is expounded, which is then proved to be existed by different quantificational methods, thus exploring its effect factors. Additionally, three ways are used to solve moral hazard in teamwork, drawing different conclusions. Finally, as solving distribution of team output, the paper designs optimal contracts separately, showing that team's interest isn't harmonious with every member's, and optimal contracts are also, which aren't self-enforcing.The paper's theoretical value is to enrich moral hazard and contract design in team, search after methods to solve them, and provide a basis for researching further. Practically its aim is to support scientific effective management in teamwork, while exerting the very way of teamwork.