Empirical Research Into Effect Of Voting Rights Imposing On Financial Policy

Voting rights is the basic rights of shareholders. Because the special condition inour country, there are both tradable stocks and non-tradable stocks in the stock market.The two kinds of shareholders have different intentions due to their originalbackground. The mechanism of voting rights' defect deduce that the final financialpolicy choosed always are in the interests of non-tradable shareholders.The voting rights mechanism develops with the naissance of corporation. Itgrows from "One Person, One Voting" mechanism to "One share, One voting" and"the majority capital deciding" mechanism . In our country, the stated shareholderscan't vote with foot. So, on the one hand, voting rights will transfer from the minorshareholders to the controlling ones, and on the other hand, the controllingshareholders will deprive the minor ones in order to make up their loss.As regards the choice of the dividend policy, non-tradable shareholders lean tocash dividend and tradable shareholders lean to stock dividend. We will root out thedifferent attitudes towards dividend policy from applying the model of game theory.On the basis of relevant references, the paper continues from the angle of ownershipstructure. Through setting up a series of regression equations, the relationship ofdividend policy and ownership structure is found out. As concerning the voting rights ,the author find: when the non-tradable shares are in the controlling station, listedcompany will always choose cash dividend policy. The result lies in the defect of"One share, One voting" mechanism and "the majority capital deciding" mechanism;When the tradable shares are in the controlling station, the tradable shareholders'interests still can not be satisfied and it lies in the defect of the applying way of votingrights.Finally, the author give some policy suggestions about how to perfect themechanism of voting rights and it's applying way.