The Insider Trading And Cournot Game With Incomplete Signal

In this thesis， We focus on the insider trading andCournot game with incomplete signals received by market makersor the insider in a risk asset market. This thesis is organizedthe following three chapters.In Chapter1, some basic concepts are introduced,including conditional probability with properties and thebasic model of insider trading.In Chapter2, we study insider trading when market makersreceive some incomplete signals in the risk asset market. Part1deals with insider trading when market makers receive someincomplete signals about partial noisy orders. It shows thatif the more observed, the more expected profits, intensity oftrading and liquidity in the market are all decreasing. However,they have no influence on the releasing of information aboutthe value of the risk value. In parts2, we will discuss theinsider trading when market makers observe parts of signalsabout liquidation value of the risk asset. It shows thatintensity of trading, expected profits and liquidity in themarket will be changed if the liquidation value is observed moreor less.Chapter3studies a Cournot game of insider trading when twoinsiders receive the same parts of liquidation value of the riskasset. We use the method of Schmidt orthogonalization toseparate the information about the diachronic liquidation value, and get the insider trading equilibrium solution withrelated conclusions.In the final, summaries and outlooks are given.