The Evolutionary Games And Optimal Cooperation Enhancement On Spatial Networks

With the development of science and technology, and the social progress are constantly followed, while the study of nature and human society become more deep. For real network in the life, initially people just make some relatively simple network model to validate whether the correct understanding of the actual network, and later with the deepening of understanding, the concept of complex networks has been proposed. The last more than ten years researchers continue to explore nonlinear system of complex networks, for the dynamic behavior of complex networks they have a clearer understanding.Game theory is a comprehensive discipline which to study the individuals choose to participate and influence the behavior of the results among social networks, in real life, it can provide the basis for some of our selection decisions. Because the game involves the correlation model in line with the actual situation, the various issues related to the evolution of the game model of the network in recent years has become a topic of complex network researchers explored in depth. Currently, the research collaboration on complex network game model is rich and detailed discussions can been found in many areas. Among this article, we focuse on the space network to start some discussion of evolutionary game. First, we constructed the model of the space network:Firstly the widely known lattice network is introduced, on this basis, we introduce a parameter r which indicates random probability to determine the specific location of network nodes, and the parameter d which determines the connection between two network nodes, by this we can construct the needed spatial network. Then we were in the prisoner’s dilemma game based on the evolution of the network, and find that the density of network collaborators when it reaches steady state is connected closely related to r indicating network randomness, d indicating the connection between two network nodes and b indicating the payoff of a defector facing a collaborator. Finally, we explore the underlying reasons behind this phenomenon. The randomness of the network will inevitably lead to changes of nodes’ degree distribution:the high degrees tend to choose the cooperative strategy to assist the formation of cooperator clusters while the low degrees tend to prevent the formation of such clusters.