An Impact Study Between Executive Compensation And Enterprise Performance Of Listed High-tech Enterprises By The Intruduction Of Supervision Variables

In recent years, executive compensation become the focus of academics, media and investor, the literatures related to executive compensation are in large numbers. According to the 2006 survey of global institutional investors released by consulting firms of corporate controlling (Institutional Shareholderer Services), corporate governance, executive compensation has become the most important aspects of the three in Canada, continental Europe, the EU countries, as well as British and American. How about executive compensation level of listed companies, do they abuse funds of shareholder, this is a problem many investors concerned about. Many Chinese and foreign scholars use a variety of theories to explain executive compensation, such as principal-agent theory, incentive theory, human capital property theory, optimal compensation contracts theory. There are many scholars study in-depth on factors that influence executive compensation and found a number of factors affecting executive pay, such as company size, capital structure, regional differences, the nature of the controlling shareholder and management shareholders, whose research provides the basis for follow-up study.By the Separation of ownership and control, the managerial compensation is considered to be an important influence of corporate controlling machanism that impacts the management decisions, as regulatory mechanisms, in one of the means for the board of directors to mitigate the agency problem. According to the Western classical compensation theory, performance based contracts could be an alternative of regulation. Foreign research results have confirmed that the enterprise mornitoring are associated with executive incentive on agency problems, when the regulation strengthening, the executive incentive can be reduced. In China, the reasearch on executive compensation focused on these aspects of the relationship with enterprise performance, the compensation factors, the relationship with earnings management and the relationship with corporate cotrolling, the affect Research between executive compensation and enterprise performance by the introduction of enterprise supervision rarely see. On the selection of sample, most researchers choose Shanghai and Shenzhen stock data, analysis for specific industry is rarely see. So what kind of affect if we research the enterprise supervision factors between executive compensation and enterprise performance will be? In this paper, based on previous studies, we taking firm size, debt ratio, annual, regional, nature of the controlling shareholder and executive ownership into account, introducting the enterprise supervision variables, in order to research what kind of affect will be between the executive compensation and enterprise performance of listed high-tech enterprises? Study on specific industry: whether do supervision variables affect our executive compensation significantly? what kind of affect will supervision factors impact the performance-based compensation sensitivity? Statistical tests on samples showed that: executives compensation system in China has already have the incentive mechanism, corporate supervision affect executives compensation, and also affect the performance-based compensation sensitivity.