| In modern enterprise system, the separation of ownership and management in company lead to the management benefit goal isn't often benefit goal of owners ,and the client will in management company often appear to deviate from the owners of the company, not benefit maximization. The executive stock option system give management right in future by buying shares in the company agreed with the right price, part residual claims of manager bind the interests of management and company, making decisions of company executives to increase the benefit. But the executive stock option defects also cannot ignore, especially it to the management of the rich improper legitimate interests, make its incentive effect weakens. Thus, research on the ESO is imperative. Based on our company manager incentive stock option of the current situation, the existence of the solutions for the main defects, taking advantage of economics, finance, management, accounting, statistics, and so on knowledge and the research achievements at home and abroad, from the perspective of the improper legitimate interests to make systematic, in-depth analysis of executive stock options study. The first half of the article analyzes the results of research have been carried out at home and abroad, to find the features of executive stock option and carefully studied the theoretical basis of ESO produced, discussed different characteristics the executive stock option and restricted stock and why the executive stock option rather than restricted stock as the research object. In the latter half part of the article, the first do an empirical study to domestic ESO and company performance on correlation, then analyze the reasons that executive stock options be able to exist and be eternal, and from the perspective of the improper legitimate interests to find its cause weakened incentive effects, make design improvements of the existing ESO system to enhance the incentive effect, finally summarize as well as subsequent follow-up research in this area is prospected. This unprecedented analysize the present defects of ESO from the view of improper legitimate interests, pointed out that the behavior about the executives getting benefit through the channels permitted by law, but do not conform to reason. Because the exercise price of executive stock option is not to eliminate the systemic risk, ESO's risk and return asymmetry, decision mode of granted number is unreasonable, spread benefits to management gived through exercise is no maximum limit, which may lead to a negative current profit, This design of a new equation of executive stock options, solves these problems. Eventually this article come to this conclusion: In theory the implementation of executive stock option is necessary , but practice has proved that the incentive of internal grant management executive stock options is not obvious, therefore reform the existing system of executive stock options is essential. |
