Intellectual Capital Information Disclosure And Corporate Governance

Nowadays how to draw up debt policy and make the cost of capital minimum has become the hot topic of theorists and practitioners. With the development of financing decision theory, scholars have studied the structure of capital theoretically and empirically, and the focus of research shifts from the basic choice of leverage to the financing decisions more detailed, such as debt maturity structure. The corporate debt financing policy is a necessary part of the whole financing decisions, and different debt maturity has different incentive characteristics. There is no difference between long-term and short-term debt, but it is the optimal debt maturity structure that makes the cost of debt financing lower. Therefore, in order to finally realize the maximization of the interests of the shareholders, even of the social benefit, the firm must choose the right debt maturity structure.At present, it is the beginning stage to study empirically the relationship between the corporation governance structure and the corporate debt maturity structure, and many gaps still exist. Because of the special background of institution, the listed firms in China have their own characteristics, especially embodied in equity structure and capital market development, etc. Therefore, it is important to study the relationship between the corporate governance structure and corporate debt maturity structure with the reality in our country.According to the characteristics of this study, this paper, based on the principal-agent theory, takes the data of the 442 listed manufactures of 2006-2008 as research samples. A panel data model is developed, using individual fixed effects regression method, to study empirically the effects of the shareholding structure on debt maturity structure of Chinese manufacturing listed companies. The empirical results show that:(1) the relationship between the share ratio of the largest shareholder and debt maturity structure is positive significantly; (2) the relationship between share percent of top 5 shareholders and corporate debt maturity structure is positive significantly; (3) the relationship between the share ratio of the first ten shareholder except the first and debt maturity structure is positive significantly; (4) compared with non-state-owned actual control, the state-owned enterprises directly controlled under the central government for the listed company has more long-term debt; (5) compared with non-state-owned actual control, the enterprises under the actual control of local government has fewer long-term debt; (6) compared with non-state-owned actual control, the enterprises under the actual control of state-owned assets management structure has fewer long-term debt. Therefore, to optimize debt maturity of the listed companies in China, large shareholders and corporate governance large-shareholder alliance should be prompted, develop institutional investors developed vigorously, state-owned shares reformed, and the bond market developed accelerated.