The Analysis Of China's Rural Labor Mobility Regulate Institution Change

China's planned economic system led to the accumulation of a large number of rural surplus populations. In the reform and opening up the eastern coast of the priority development strategies lead to the gap between China's regional economies. One of the significant performance of this gap is the current phenomenon of large-scale flow of rural labor force is particularly prominent. Although this is the inevitable result of the process of urbanization in developing countries, corresponding regulations and guidance system is necessary to remain. More than thirty years since reform and opening up, China's rural labor mobility system has undergone several changes. The research have been attracting the full attention of academia and government departmentsWe use institutional economics, development economics and the theory of game theory to try to explore the flow of rural labor inherent in the process of institutional change trend. Firstly, we are talking about literatures on labor migration system as well as institutional change and game theory both in and abroad. Secondly, we analyze the formal institutional change of labor mobility in China which has strong path dependence. We also talk about Groups of rural workers and urban residents in the informal system. So we believe that Changes in the Chinese system of labor mobility is a cause with features as mandatory formal system with a clear change and Induced changes in the informal system.We use evolutionary game and Cournot repeated game model specify and verify the process of evolution and change of informal systems and formal system. According to the rural labor and urban residents and the city government's game behavior, we believe that the correlation between the formal system and informal system in Chinese system of labor mobility, the Labor mobility Cycles of institutional change and "lock in" risk, have a larger value of academic research. Given the complexity of the actual situation, this paper also proposed the expansion of several models. Since then, we use the experience of 1978-2008 data to validate the conclusions of the game models, and characterize the institutional changes on labor flows tend to relax in the periodic fluctuations in the overall trend, so that the timing and the key of reform is "node." As a longitudinal study of reality, we re-interpretation of some phenomenon of flow of rural labor force at this stage, and accordingly to these to give the policy propose recommendations to reflect the applicability of the paper's views.China's Institutional Change in the labor movement has significant research space. For the combination of formal and informal systems as well as game system methodology in the field of labor mobility in China, our conclusions may have some values of practical significance.