Listed Companies' Top Managers' Nonlinear Payments Incentive Research: Based On The Risk Match Between Shareholder And Top Manager

Since Chandler's "manager revolution", management incentive constitute the focus and nodus of corporate governance. As a prevalent means of incentive, there are exceptionally great researches on management, while most of which didn't render effective guidance of their practice. There are still many problems on management incentive in listed companies. This paper systemically recall related literatures on management incentives to analyze the domestic research and the flaws of . these researches。On the basis of literatures summarization, we point out that it's hard to learn the actual incentives effects when the related analysis of manager reward and corporation performance was started based on the linear hypothesis on reward—performance. On this basis, this paper, based on the perspective of the risk avoidance differences between principal and agent, theoretically proves the effective types of manager incentive in listed companies and render the next hypothesis about demonstration study.Based on the listed companies'panel data ranger from 1998 to 2008,this paper demonstrates the non-linear management incentive, and finds that corporate performance positively related with the management compensation, so does the square of the corporation performance. However, the cube of the corporation performance negatively related with the management compensation. There is an incentive inflexion in the listed companies'management incentive. Managers'human resource capital embodies in some degree of reward,however, there's a bigger incentive effect in the process of management incentive.In combination with the theoretical analysis and the demonstration studies, this paper countermeasures the management incentive in our listed companies,and gives out the mode of corporation governance based on the perspective of the risk matches between principal and agent, at the same time, we respectively discussed the design of top manager compensation; the selection of listed companies'new top managers; the selection of listed companies'new investor. In the end, this paper render the conclusion and related countermeasure. In the process of inspiring top managers, the listed companies should fully take the risk share between the principal and agent into consideration, try their best to make management compensation match the risk share between them. As the advancement of the increase in compensation accumulation and the intension of the stock right incentive, the entrepreneur risk characterization degenerates little by little, which requires to categorically deny the exponential enhancement in that there isn't an effective match between compensation incentives and risk share, which thus reduce the incentive effect.