| With the wide implementation of the Basel Capital Accord around the world, the global financial crisis erupted in 2007 because of the sub-prime lending crisis, the failure of many great banks made both policy makers and administrators of commercial banks again focus on risk-taking behaviors of commercial banks. Whether the implementation of government regulation can affect risk-taking become the focus of attention. The Basel II Capital Accord takes market discipline as the third extent of regulation, which means the market discipline is very important for banking regulation in the future, so whether market discipline can be effectively given full scope to risk-taking behaviors is also the object of this study.In this paper, research methods include theoretical and empirical analysis, qualitative and quantitative analysis. We analyze how the pressure of supervision, including government regulation and market discipline, effects on the risk-taking of commercial banks. The paper is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is introduction, which introduces the research background and significance of the paper, academic achievements of domestic and foreign scholars are summarized and concluded, and we also describe research ideas and innovations of this paper. The second chapter is the theoretical basis of the supervision pressure on banks' risk-taking behaviors, we introduce the sources, definitions and relationship of the external regulatory pressures (including government regulatory pressure and market discipline pressure), focusing on the analysis of regulatory pressure on risk-taking behavior of banks directly and through banking market power indirectly effects on the risk-taking. The third chapter, we use game theory to analyze the formation of, risk-taking behavior which only one bank included, and we construct the theoretical model to research the risk-taking behaviors which some banks included, further analysis factors of risk-taking behaviors of commercial banks. We select the Lerner index to measure the banking market power, information disclosure index is constructed to quantify the pressure of market discipline of banks, and non-performing loan ratio, Z-score and solvency margin are selected as the indicators to measure banks' credit exposures and overall risk-taking behavior. Chapter IV is empirical testing, we firstly construct the empirical model, use multiple regression to analyze the regulatory pressure on risk-taking of commercial banks, the results show that the pressure of capital adequacy effect on risk-taking behavior of joint-equity banks, while the effect of state-owned banks has little, but the pressure of market discipline has little effect on risk-taking behaviors of banks, the pressure of capital adequacy can indirectly effect credit risk-taking behavior of joint-equity banks through the market power, but can't effect the banks overall risk-taking behavior, and we know the variation of capital regulatory pressure and variation of risk-taking are in balance between the long-term relationship by co-integration test. Chapter V is the paper's conclusions, and we put forward policy recommendations.The innovations in this paper can be described in three aspects as follows:Firstly, we analyze the mechanism of the pressure of supervision on risk-taking behaviors of commercial banks, which include the direct effect and the indirect effect through market power of banks.Secondly, we construct a disclosure index of commercial bank. The disclosure index quantifies the bank's status of information disclosure, which is the premise to quantify the impact of market discipline pressure on risk-taking behaviors.Thirdly, we use the theoretical and empirical analysis method to monitor the pressure effect on banks' exposure, and by the comparison between large state-owned banks and joint-equity banks, we analyze the government regulatory pressure and the pressure of market discipline on banks'credit exposure and the overall exposure. |
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