The Major Shareholder Governance In Natural-person Holding Company

After 1980s, along with development change of modern enterprise condition, corporate governance becomes a worldwide topic. There is growing recognition that the good corporate governance mechanism will not only help to reduce agency costs and improves enterprise value, but also conducive to optimizing the allocation of funds, then promotes economic growth. Based on corporate governance theories, this paper, in the general frame of principal-agent theory, analyzes major stockholder's expropriation issues to the small shareholder, supervision issues to the board of directors and the control issues to management level in natural-person holding company. Then author draws the conclusions by empirical research.This paper has mainly completed the following several aspect works: (1)Beginning from reorganizing associated research documents of corporate governance, has put forward this paper's research mentality and the research technique. (2)Analyzes major stockholder's government mechanism and the government mechanism under the natural person controlling, and elaborates major stockholder's active role, negative role and supervisory role.(3)Analyzes fundamental mode of major shareholder's expropriation issues theoretically, namely occupied capital of listed company, abused related-party transactions, and used false information to mislead other small investors; Elaborates major stockholder's supervision issues to the board of directors and the control issues to management level in natural-person holding company, it provides corresponding theory for the following empirical study. (4)Through empirical study analyzes the relationship between major shareholder governance and corporate performance, shows that:"one big share alone"don't harm to the corporate performance; major shareholder's capital occupied and the cahoots'degree of large shareholders and executives are both negative correlation to corporate performance; The family controlling degree's increase will affect corporate performance; while an effective incentive mechanism will promote a better development in family listed companies. (5) Finally, proposes some countermeasures to consummate natural persons holding corporate, the conclusions and relevant recommendations will provide actual value reference to advance the level of corporation governance of listed companies.