Relative Research Between The Structure Of Corporate Governance And Audit Independence

With the rapid economic development in the world today, more and more companies are coming up and they gradually penetrated into all spheres of society in various forms affecting people's lives. The influence of quality of accounting information on people's economic life is gradually deepening. At present, there are a lot of researches in domestic and international academic circles for the independence of the audit. However, in recent years domestic and foreign stock market exposed a series of audit failures, for example "Lehman Brothers fraud case" "Oriental era of financial fraud case" "Sichuan Changhong fraud case",which improve that there are some deficiencies for listed companies. This paper uses agency theory and stakeholder theory, combined with historical data of Chinese listed companies, from the perspective of corporate governance, to analyze the reasons for the lack of independence of listed companies in China and discuss how to provide recommendations to improve auditor independence. With economic prosperity and the increase of business, the quality of accounting information in the economic life of society as a whole is very important. The quality of accounting information on capital markets plays a key role in decision-makers to make decisions. Because of the false accounting information, accounting fraud and other criminal activities increased year by year.Now, corporate governance theory has become a more mature theoretical system than before. To address the separation of ownership and management rights problems, modern company established a set of governance mechanisms and strive to avoid to the maximum extent the losses caused by such problems. China's market economy carries out late and China's corporate governance both in theory and in practice are still in its infancy. Most of them draw on the experience of Western countries, such as the establishment of the board of supervisors and so on. Because of modern economic life and the need of quality of accounting information, making a perfect structure of corporate governance in our country, improving the use of structure of corporate governance in practice are very important and pressing issues. At present, though the forensic accounting research has gradually unfolded, many problems still need further improvement.Modern corporate governance structure is a definition which combines separation of corporate control with ownership of the agency problem caused by various mechanisms in general. The emergence of independent audit is to address the agency problem within the company, whose role is coordinating the interests of owners and operators to promote the interests of balance between the maximum, A relatively balanced corporate governance structure will be significantly improving the independence of the audit. In addition, with the further development of economic and social relations, shareholders, banks, government, and more and more potential investors and other stakeholders need to use the audit by the accounting auditors to report information, Audit reports of listed companies are no longer the company's proprietary products, and they should also consider the audit commissioned by the main use of the audit report information tilt to various stakeholders. At the same time, stakeholders in corporate governance are also an integral part of external governance structure of the company.Firstly, this article analyses corporate governance and auditor independence from the perspective of agency theory and stakeholder. From the historical data of Chinese listed companies, it makes use of Logistic regression model to analyses of the status of corporate governance in order to give a prove for an positive internal governance structure basis. Secondly, from the fact of the audit market and supply and demand of audit, focusing on the structure of audit commission, to discuss causes of lack of auditor independence. Finally, we put forward some recommendations to proposed reconstruction of the audit commission and the relevant supporting measures to ultimately improve the audit independence. Through this study, I want to provide some reference and a new perspective for others who study the future issues related to auditor independence.