Study On Effectiveness Of Senior Managers' Pay Sticky Of Listed Companies In China

Enterprise senior managers incentive problem is always the hot spot of theory and practice research, with the deepening of research, people are more and more clearly realizing that based on performance of the salary plays a very significant role to top manager incentive. The research of listed companies'senior manager salary both at home and abroad pay for quite a long time, the perspective is gradually changing. In recent years China began to continue the abroad research of the executive pay and performance sensitivity asymmetric features, found that executive compensation of listed companies in China also has the asymmetric features that when sales are up significantly higher salary increase extent declined salary decrease performance of amplitude, so there exists the salary sticky. But is this kind of salary viscous existence reasonable, whether it can have incentive effect on the listed company top managers, which research seems poor. This paper, from the angle, takes the listed company from manufacturing industry in China as the research object, mainly researches in whether it exist the phenomenon that When sales are up significantly higher salary increase extent declined salary decrease performance of amplitude under the special environment of financial crisis, and this viscous features of executive pay on the enterprise future performance, as to expect the research conclusion have a reference value to both theory and practice field.This paper introduces the background and significance of the topic, and indicates the research scope and methodology at first. Then expounds the study carried out in this field both at home and abroad in detail. Next, the manufacturing and salary changes performance of listed companies in China is described in the overall situation. The fourth step, proposes research hypotheses to define the regression equation. In empirical analysis, this paper chooses Level model, which takes after excluding non-recurring net profit EBITil and net profit NIil as performance variables, first carried out regression equation with company performance and executive pay of 573 listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen as import parameters, and then found between executive pay and performance were positively related, the hypothesis 1 is proved with the fact that the rate of senior management increase salary is conspicuous higher than the performance drops significantly reduce the rate of pay when performance of the company's executive pay rises; and then carried out regression equation with company performance and executive pay of 654 listed companies to drop sticky in recent 3 years in Shanghai and Shenzhen as import parameters, and then found that viscous and future executive pay significant negative correlation between performance, compensation of executives of listed companies manufacturing such a viscous exist, there is no other motivation theory to strengthen the management of two-factor theory, and theory of management, senior managers play a positive incentive. This sticky features of senior management salary, maybe breed management laziness of senior management and the thought that who not being punished always, is likely to become a way that manager shirk duty of management failure and over-protective behavior for manager to enterprise.