The Empirical Analysis Of The Controlling Shareholders Holding Reduction Under The Full Circulation

After completion of the stock circulation reform, with the end of the restricted period of the limited circulation shares of the most companies, there are massive emergence of "the wave of lifting" on the stock market.The holding reduction of large-and-small size stock became a hot issue, The controlling shareholder as company controller, controlling shareholders holding reduction became more hot, so this paper think of controlling shareholders holding reduction as the research object, look into the reduction of motivation to provide the theoretical basis for development of relevant policies about the controlling shareholders holding reduction.This paper study controlling shareholders holding reduction by establish a dynamic model of two-stage. The result show that the optimal reduction ratio of controlling shareholders are negatively related to the company's profitability, positively related to the original stake, negatively related to the enlarge of investor protection, positively related to the controlling weights levels, negatively related to the company size, negatively related to the market average rate of returns, positively related to the risks, positively related to the Enlarge of the equity concentration.To verify the correctness of assumptions by selecting the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market as the samples of motivation of the reduction of holdings of the controlling shareholder. The assumptions are verified by empirical results except the assumption of the relationship between controlling shareholder reduction ratio and the original stake, And the empirical results show that the main reason of the controlling shareholders holding reduction are the high equity concentration and the poor company performance. Also found the controlling shareholder is not commonly reduced their holdings of company shares. The most of controlling shareholders maintained the original ratio, even increased the holdings of company shares. This paper argues the reason for this phenomenon is the existence of the cost reduction.This paper propose a series of policy recommendations to solve the problems which occurred during the process of the controlling shareholders holding reduction, including strengthening information disclosure, energetically fostering institutional investors, strengthening investor education, strengthening the internal governance of listed companies, establishing and improve the long-effective mechanism of investor protection etc.