| Urban mass transit system (UMTS), which is characterized by high operation safety, high transport efficiency and huge capacity, is playing a critical role in passenger traffic of modern cities. An appropriate mechanism of renewal and reconstruction for fixed-asset (RRFA) is the premise of guaranteeing the system operation safety and it is also benefit to realize resource efficient allocation of UMTS. The utilization of fund and enterprise management of the UMTS in China is relative inefficiency, because of the information asymmetry of the principal-agent and the shortage of encouragement in the existing mechanisms. Therefore, it is of great significance to investigate the incentive mechanism for the RRFA of urban transit system in China.This paper analyses the characteristics of the existing mechanisms of RRFA in the Chinese typical metropolis, and explores the feasibility of the traditional compensate mechanisms China UMTS, which includes Cost-plus contract, Fixed price contract, Incentive contract and Commercial Franchise contract. Furthermore, this paper models the design of incentive contract with the objection of maximizing the public welfare and proposes the corresponding application mechanism for China UMTS. The main contents are as follows:1.Compares the characteristics of the three typical subsidies modes, including government leading, private enterprise and public-private partnership. The applications of the existing mechanisms in China indicate that the compensate contracts are relatively simple and they are lack of incentive, which would lead to the inefficiency of enterprise management and the enormous operation cost.2.Analysis the characteristics of Chinese urban transit systems and the corresponding challenges for RRFA:the multi-layer principle-agent relationship, information asymmetry of principle-agent, the agent may chase the excess profit without any incentive strategy. Analyzing the feasibility of applying the traditional compensate modes in Chinese UMTS, this paper points out incentive contract is the most proper mechanism for RRFA in China as it is helpful to overcome the information asymmetry as well as the moral hazard in RRFA problem.3.Construct the incentive contract model for RRFA with the aim of maximizing the public farewell. There are two typical parameters, i.e. bonus coefficient and punish coefficient, incorporated in the model, which based on the individual rationality constraint (IR) and the incentive compatibility constraint (IC). In case of high efficiency of enterprise management, the enterprise is able to share the saving of the operation cost. On the other hand, the enterprise would be punished when extra operation cost is occurred due to inefficient management. The theoretical analysis indicates that the punish coefficient is more applicable to guarantee the effort of enterprises to enhance their efficiency, in the comparison with bonus coefficient.4.This paper proposes an incentive contracts mechanism for the RRFA of metropolis in China, the concepts of which include an increasing rate of enterprise punishment in case of deficit and a constant rate of sharing the benefits in case of saving operation cost. Furthermore, the proposed mechanism also takes into account the parameter fault-tolerance and develops an algorithm of parameter self-regulation.5.Incorporating the incentive contract into a real-life RRFA of metropolis in China. The supporting measures, which include building an information sharing platform, introducing the third party ruling and setting the maintenance standards of the fixed-asset are also discussed in this thesis aiming to guarantee the effect of incentive contract. |
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