Research On Tax Compliance Decisions Under Macro Perspective

Tax compliance decisions and the degree of the tax compliance directly affect the size of tax revenue losing in the country. Tax compliance behavior has been a hot issue for government around the world. Over the years, domestic and foreign scholars have done lots of researches about it, traditional tax compliance theory including the expected utility theory and prospect theory, both based on micro-perspective, analysis of motives and factors of the non-compliance of the individual taxpayer. In this paper,we change it into a macro perspective, extended the tax compliance behavior to the social groups.This paper draws on many domestic and foreign scholars on tax compliance for various views, for the first time to build the tax compliance decision model which covered deterrent factors, government factors, institutional factors, economic factors and individual characteristics. And construct the two game theory models:supply of public goods and taxes compliance model, and tax levers and tax payer model. We use these models to illustrate the causes of tax non-compliance, and the deterrent effect on tax compliance, then questioned the deterrent factors which put by classical theory. Put out the theory named "deterrent reversal" by first time. The paper argues that in bad equilibria, as tax evasion and corruption become more common, they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered. The increase of penalties and auditing can have perverse impacts and increase tax non-compliance.Based on this theory, we raise four recommendations to increase the degree of tax compliance by tax legislation, supply of public goods, tax administration and tax moral, in order to reduce the loss of tax revenue, and promote the standardization of tax services.