A Study On Propping Behavior Of Major Shareholder Of China's Listed Companies After The Non-Tradable Share Reform

May 9,2005 is the date when Non-tradable Share Reform officially started.Up to the end of 2010, only 7 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges have not started the Non-tradable Share Reform, which marks a staged success of the Reform in securities market of mainland China. However, in the post-Reform times, will the major shareholders of companies listed in mainland China actively take care about their companies'operation results and take effective propping measures to maintain a sustained and rapid growth of the listed companies'operation results; will the major shareholders of listed companies take active and effective measures to solve conflicts between the listed company's management and shareholders'interests to ensure a stable incretion of the listed companies'operation results; can the stock price of the listed company in the secondary market properly reflect the mutual valuation judgment of major and minor shareholders, thus procuring a healthy and fast growth of securities market of mainland China. These are the issues this essay would specifically address.Chapter One is introduction. This chapter introduces the background in choosing this topic, significance and method of the research and the structural arrangement of this essay;Chapter Two is a comprehensive summary of research documentation relating to equity division and behavior of major shareholders by scholars from home and abroad. In regard of behavior of major shareholders, this chapter makes a summary of the documentation relating to the history of researches on major shareholder's behavior and tunneling and propping behavior of the major shareholders;Chapter Three is a theoretical analysis of the propping behavior of major shareholder, including the classification of major shareholders' behavior, theoretical basis of major shareholders'propping behavior, and the relationship between major shareholder's propping behavior and corporate governance;Chapter Four is an analysis of the major shareholders'propping behavior and operation results of listed companies. Theoretical, statistic and case analysis are used to study major shareholder's propping behavior and operation results of listed companies respectively. Furthermore, the essay makes an important addition to the definition of propping behavior of major shareholders, presenting that "in the current securities market of mainland China, equity incentive plane is one type of propping behavior commonly adopted by the major shareholders of China's listed companies". Finally, the essay makes a case analysis on the classic case "Yili Shares" to analyze propping behavior through equity incentive plan.Chapter Five is a summary of the whole essay, which is divided to two sections, i.e. "main conclusion and relevant suggestions" and "innovation and deficiencies of this essay"...