Research On The Game Between Manufacturer And Retailer In One Two-sided Market

As the modern retail trade develops rapidly, there are more and more conflicts between manufactures and retailers for the location of profits. The retailers have almost controlled the demand terminals, which places the manufactures in a dilemma. Traditional one-sided market theory could not give an satisfied answer to the decisions of retailer's two-sided prices and manufacturer's entrance or exit to a retailer's platform. As the number of platform enterprise increases, two-sided market theory absorbs more and more attention. Now the theory focuses on credit card, communication markets and software platform. The researches on retailers have little concerns with manufacturers'influence on market. This article researches the game between retailer and manufacturers with market influence in two-sided market.The model here is one 4-period game model, including one basic model, one brand model which is the basic with consumer structure and brand effect, and one market-share model which is the basic with market-share factor. They are used to analysis the decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer in different conditions. The firms do the hotelling competition, compare the max profit in different platform and finally choose the platform; the retailer compares its own profits after different firms'decision and make higher or lower two-sided market prices. At the same time, some intuitionistic conclusions are archived: the firms'decisions are related with two-sided prices, consumer structure and the market share; the retailers'decisions are related with brand influence and externalities. At last the models are used to analysis the conflict reason between manufactures and retailers and make some suggestions to manufactures about how to get along with the retailers.