Study On The Incentive Mechanism Of Scheduling Optimization For Construction Programme Managemet

With the sustained and rapid development of our national economy, domestic investment in construction projects and their scale have been greatly increased, more and more construction projects appear with large and group forms, especially the national investment large-scale projects, such as the South-to-North Water Diversion, the Three Gorges project, the Shanghai World Expo, the West-to-East Gas Engineering, and so on. More and more experts recommend that we should adopt more scientific ways and means to manage the construction of large-scale and group projects.With respect to research object of domestic large-scale construction projects, by generally applying programme management thoughts, integrated management theory, Stackelberg game theory, bi-level programming theory and some other methods for system optimization and decision-making modeling, the theory and the integrated model of programme management was qualitatively analyzed, and the incentive mechanism of scheduling optimization for construction programme management was quantitatively studied. The main works as follows:(1)Firstly analysis the management problems in the practice of construction programme, based on the integrated management theory, innovates the integrated construction programme Six-dimension integrated management system, namely the integrated management system which contains the programme organization, the programme element, the programme lifecycle, the programme objective, the programme information system and the programme technology knowledge.(2)From the view of realizing the best construction programme scheduling and lifecycle utility maximization, considering the influence of the programme owners' expected operating income, the contractors' opportunity return and the reputation gain, supposing the contractors' total cost was constituted with direct cost, indirect cost and scheduling compression cost, and the scheduling compression cost was appreciatively expressed with time-cost relationship index function, then a construction programme Stackelberg master-slave hierarchical decision model in which the programme owners for upper policymakers and the contractors for lower policymakers was constructed. The model was solved by heuristic genetic algorithm, and the effectiveness and feasibility of the optimization model was proofed through example calculation analysis. (3)Considering the influence of the flexible resource constraints, the forms and the methods of engineering progress payment, the owner's expected operating income ,the reputation gain, and the contractors' opportunity return, supposing the contractor's total cost was constituted with own resource cost and flexible resource cost, then a construction programme Stackelberg master-slave hierarchical decision model under the flexible resource constraints was constructed, the model was solved by heuristic genetic algorithm, and the feasibility of this incentive model on scheduling optimization was proved through example calculation.