Split Share Structure Reform Of The Private Benefits Of Control Factors Of The Impact Of Empirical Research

In recent years, major shareholders of listed companies to use its control of the right to continue to seize control of private gain has become a modern corporate governance theory and corporate finance theory, the core content. With the split-share reform continued to deepen,China's capital market will change greatly,which may result in the level of invisible benefits of control become to change accordingly. Based on that, This paper studies the split share structure reform of listed companies on China's control of the impact of the level of private benefits, and the level of private benefits of control-related factors affecting the empirical analysis.In this paper, the relevant theory and literature based on the combination of listed companies in China May 9, 2005 to December 31, 2008 the bulk of the actual situation in the transfer of shares agreement, using large equity premium and multiple linear regression analysis, respectively, measured share - set before and after the reform of the level of private benefits of control and the level of private benefits of control factors change.The empirical conclusions shows that: the companies which have not experienced the split-share reform is 29.1753% , but the companies which have experienced the split-share reform is 23.8946 %,it has deceased by 5.28%.It shows that the split-share reform can exactly consummate corporate government mechanism and thus play a positive role in the curb of the invisible benefits. Besides,this paper also uses multiple linear regression method to analyze relevant affected factors of invisible benefits.First, the aspect of corporate governance structure, before and after the split-share reform's Degree of equity of checks and balances the degree equity of checks and balances,the proportion of the outstanding shares of private benefits and control of negative correlation. However, pre-stock reform of these two indicators did not pass the significance test, The share reform after the adoption of these two indicators were significant test. It showed that degree of checks and balances and outstanding shares of stock increase in the proportion of private benefits of control has some inhibitory effect, but it is not yet obvious.Second, the aspect of financial status, before and after the split share structure reform and control of the company's financial leverage are positively related to private benefits, but the stock through a significant change before the test, the share reform after the financial leverage and significant private benefits of control is bad. It shows that stock reform the supervisory role of the former creditors of the company has not been exploited. Creditors of the company after the share reform the supervisory role of the former than the share reform has increased, but not obvious. Shares of the company's profitability before and after the reform level and the size of the company are related to control over the private gain significant negative correlation, indicating that the acquisition of control over self-interest is a good place in profitability and the company's smaller businesses. Through analysis, we found that changes in the structure of corporate governance, stock liquidity changes in controlling shareholders investment objectives and investment income sources of the changes in the external supervision and investor protection of the environment led to changes in the level of private benefits of control as the reason.. This shows that good corporate governance structure and a good capital market environment can effectively inhibit the controlling shareholder of the "tunnel" behavior, thereby reducing the level of private benefits of control.