Classication Study On Formation Mechanism Of Enterprise's Patent Pool Based On Game Theory

In the age of knowledge economy, intellectual property represented by patent is an important resources which enterprise obtains sustainable competitive advantage. Because of the complexity of technology, all essential patents of a new technology are hold by many enterprises. If producers want to use a new technology, they need negotiate with these essential patentee in order to obtain the patent licensing. This undoubtedly increases the cost, and cut down the enthusiasm which producers upgrade their product. It didn't benefit for the application of new technology. In order to increase the implementing efficiency and stimulate the producer's activity of using new technologies, a new organization which called Patent Pool was born. Via cross license and license packing by Patent Pool, it was helpful to combine the complementary technologies of different enterprises, accelerating industry standard, decrease the production cost of producers, raising the efficiency of patent implementing and speed up technology diffusion.But in reality, Patent Pool did not appear everywhere like bamboo shoots after a spring shower. In particular, a very small number of Patent Pool are formed by local companies in China. This dissertation selected the formation mechanism of the Patent Pool as research object to study the problem. Firstly, it studies the key elements'relations of the Patent Pool formation. Secondly, Patent Pool is divided into three categories: production-oriented enterprises closed Patents Pool, the production-oriented enterprises open Patent Pool, research enterprises open Patent Pool according to participator type of Patent Pool and the type of patent pool licensing and the competitor types of product market. Thirdly, it studies the formation mechanism of three kinds of Patent Pool under the perspective of the game theory; Finally, case study on the production-oriented enterprises closed Patent Pool and production-oriented enterprises open Patent Pool are given. This paper is divided into seven chapters:The first chapter introduces the background, purpose, content, idea and method of research.The second chapter gives an over view of the basic theory of Patent PoolThe third chapter treats the enterprises in Patent Pool abstractly, analyzes the formation mechanism of Patent Pool and gives case studies. The following main conclusions are obtained: the formation of patent pool needs the following measures: (1) To increase expected earnings of participator in the Patent Pool, (2) The Patent Pool establish an effective incentive mechanism to guide the parties to choose (cooperation, cooperation) strategy which is useful for both sides. So the participators have access to the greater benefits, and enjoy the technology licensing and technology sharing to further enhance the core competitiveness of enterprises.The fourth chapter discusses the formation mechanism of the production-oriented enterprises closed Patent Pool by game analysis and gives case studies. The following main conclusions are got : When the competitors in product market all are the production-oriented enterprises which hold essential patent, the production-oriented enterprises will not spontaneously decide to anticipate in Patent Pool. It shows that production-oriented enterprises closed patent pool will not be spontaneously formed. When the patent holder increases, whether the enterprise participate in patent pool or not, the profit decreased.The fifth chapter discusses the formation mechanism of the production-oriented enterprises open Patent Pool by game analysis and gives case studies. The main conclusions are obtained as follows: when the competitors in product market are the production-oriented enterprises which hold patent and professional manufacturers, production-oriented enterprises will spontaneously decide to participate in Patent Pool because of the pursuit of profit-maximizing, it indicates that production-oriented enterprise open Patent Pool will be spontaneously formed. When the patent holder increases, whether the enterprise participate in patent pool or not, the profit decreased.The sixth chapter studies the formation mechanism of research enterprises Patent Pool. Competitors in production market are the professional manufactures, research enterprises spontaneously decide to join in the Patent Pool because of the pursuit of profit-maximizing, it shows that the research enterprise will be spontaneously formed. When the patent holder increases, whether the enterprise participate in patent pool or not, the profit decreased.The seventh chapter summarizes some conclusions of previous statements and gives some advices for companies and government and points out the lack of the dissertation and prospects for future research.