| The incentive compensation of top management has been subjected to intensive practical and theoretical investigation since the 80's of last century.But existing studies seldom focused on the pay gap within the top management team,especially lack of deep researeh on the incentive and economical effects of the pay gap .In recent years,the phenomenon of the managerial power's impact on executive pay contracts has become a new hot spot in the field of management incentive studies at home and abroad.This text studies the issue of the pay gap within the top management team of listed A-share market companies based on the institutional situation of China,and testifies the applieability of the Tournament Theory and the Behavioral Theory on the pay gap within top management teams of China's listed companies.Furthermore,it tests the impact of the managerial power of top management on the incentive effects of the pay gap within top management teams.The conclusions include: (l)Overall,the pay gap within top management teams is consistent with the Tournament Theory. In other words,there's significant positive correlation between the pay gap and company's future performance.Combined with chinese system background,in state-owned companies the correlation is positive but not significant; in non-state-owned companies the correlation is significant positive; (2)Overall , there's significant positive correlation between the managerial power and pay gap within top management team .The correlation is positive but not significant when the companies are state owned;the correlation is significant positive when the companies are non-state owned; (3)Overall,the managerial power boosts the toumament incentive effeets of the pay gap of top management team. There is passive correlation between the managerial power and future performance but not significant in state-owned companies; the correlation is significant positive when the companies are non-state owned. |
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