Investigation On The Real Option Games Under The Incomplete Information

Option games, investigating the mutual strategies between the participants under the uncertainty, combine the real option approach with games theory and then solve the conflict between gaining options value by waiting and postponing the investment and acquiring the preemptive advantage by preempting into market in the investment decisions. Classification into option games and pertinent investigation according to the its types are not only to have more theoretic and more academic value, but also to make the research into option games more close to investment practice, so as to satisfy the need of investment decisions under the different circumstance, to push the thinking of option games more forward to apply into investment practice and then to enhance the accuracy of enterprises estimating investment chances and making decisions.This article, firstly, respectively assorts option games into growing option games, waiting option games, quitting option games and scale option games according to varieties of the real options, and into preemptive real option games, sharing real option games and privileged real option games according to competition characteristic. And then, based upon classification definition into option games, this article respectively emphasizes upon the sharing real option games and the privileged real option games and analyzes each equilibrium strategies of its under the incomplete information. It is concluded: (1) that, in the sharing real option games of incomplete information, enterprise 1, according to maximum of its profit and its rival'(enterprise 2 tactics, will choose to exercise the invest option in the threshold valueYL 1 to become the leader of market, or in the threshold value YF 1to become the follower, and enterprise 2, according to maximum of its profit and its rival'(enterprise 1) tactics correspondent to its cost type, will choose to exercise invest option in the threshold value YL 2( whether high cost or low cost) to become the leader, or in the YF 2h of high cost or in the YF 2lof low cost to become the follower, and (2) that, in the privileged real option games of incomplete information, whether high cost or low cost, privileged enterprise 1 must choose to enter into the market in the threshold value of the low cost and then yields according to themaximum monopolized output of the low cost to become the leader, and then the follower, enterprise 2, on the basis of observing enterprise 1's tactics, decide its optimal investment time according to the principle of real option approach, and (3) that later, on the basis of equilibrium strategies, sharing real option game model and privileged real option game model have been made by Ito Lemmo and by Dynamic Plan means, including leaders'and followers'real option value, present value of equilibrium profit and investment threshold value.