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Research On Opportunistic Behaviors Of R&D Alliance Members

Posted on:2007-06-23Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y YangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360185477517Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Because R&D alliance create the new technique knowledge together and transfer the knowledge for target, the enterprise take advantage of personal resources to help others disadvantage, This kind of alliance form is the high stage of alliance development. Although in economic world wave tide, R&D alliance is an inevitable trend that the enterprise exists, develop and obtain the core competitive ability. But, after R&D alliance establish, the result of a lot of R&D alliance is contrary to viewpoint at the beginning. Because the critical asset of R&D alliance is knowledge, the knowledge asset is the exclusive public product and has invisible, liquid. The member of the alliance is between in cooperation and self-concern, which pursue the biggest target of the personal beneficiation. Because the contract is incomplete, investment assets have the character of specialty, the individual knowledge is limit, it is inevitable that one steals other member knowledge assets in alliance and protect own knowledge assets, which is opportunistic behavior. That brings to the increase of enterprise cost and the loss of efficiency of alliance, eventually affect personal benefit.the current research on opportunistic behavior of R&D alliance members is mainly about sharing or transferring factor of R&D alliance, or some aspect of R&D alliance, for example, choosing the members of R&D alliance, the mechanism of allocation benefits among R&D alliance, But there is seldom research on the members of R&D alliance opportunistic behaviors from the advanced theories of enterprise, which in incomplete contractual theories.So from the angle of the economics, we analyze the reason of the member opportunism behavior in alliance, explore solution model of opportunistic behavior in R&D alliances using the incomplete contract approach. The model choosing the optimal ownership structure is base on the trade-off between inducing know-how disclosure and ensuring maximum effort, which eliminate the opportunism behavior and realize R&D alliance efficient, stable, continual development.
Keywords/Search Tags:R&D alliance, incomplete contracts, exclusive public goods
PDF Full Text Request
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