Research On Earning Management Of Listed Corporate

In these years, financial scandals were broken out in many capital markets all over the world, by which investors'confidence was influenced seriously and the healthy development of capital market was damaged greatly. Facing with serious financial frauds in capital markets, many countries governments in the world are approaching tackles of financial frauds. In a broad sense, financial frauds belong to earning managements, The Blue Ribbon Committee of American submitted Report and Recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Committee on improving the Effectiveness of corporate Audit Committees in 1999, which indicated that governances of earning managements turn to corporate governance mainly. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 also put emphasis of governance of financial report on corporate governance. However, the structure of listed corporate governance in our country is in an out-of-balance position, which can be described that shareholder structure is out-of-balance, and internal person control. As earning managements becoming common and systematic behaviors, that how to govern earning managements of listed corporate under the background of special structure of corporate governance in our country is a difficult problem needed to solve urgently.Earning managements belong to Financial Accounting category, which mainly research the behaviors by which financial report is intervened under the principal-agent contracts. The structure of corporate governance is an institution, which standardizes interested groups'rights, responsibilities and benefits under the principal-agent contracts. There is a reciprocal-influence relationship between the structures of corporate governance and earning managements; the structure of corporate governance is an important system factor in mechanism of earning managements. When putting structure of corporate governance into game analysis of earning managements, we found that the structure of corporate governance is a key institution factor affecting efficiency of earning managements. Out-of-balance structure restrains the formation of efficient earning managements, and stimulates the generation of opportunistic earning managements. Structure of corporate governance in balance can restrain opportunistic earning managements, and stimulates efficient earning managements in order to arrive to Pareto Efficiency Equilibrium, governances of earning managements should be oriented as corporate governance, and include...