Study On Rural Tax And Fee Institutional Change In China

Rural tax institution reform in rural of China following the land reform and the introduction of the household contract is the third major reform since the founding of the PRC. It is one fundamental policy to reduce the burden of farmers and increase their income. The aspects of tax reform content have been widely concerned, and the academics and politicians have had a lot of research. At present, China's rural reform process has been largely completed. From the in-depth research, the reform process will provide some inspiration and reference for the future reform of the rural community. This is also the fundamental focus of the article.To undertake an in-depth study of our tax institution reform, the government cann't been looked upon as the "perfect" government for the provision of public services. The article will analysis the institution changes of the tax reform process by virtue of the new institutional economics and the new political economics, and the roles assumed by the farmers, the government and other groups in the reform and the decisions they face to hint the underlying causes of and passion of the institution change. And the processes of the mutual negotiations and the games are to decide the ways and trails.Farmers as the direct beneficiaries of changes in rural tax and fee institution make no apology for having become sponsors; Government as a rational economic person, also can recognize the reform will bring about an increase in government revenue receipts. Of course, they are also faced with their own institution costs. With the premising cost of the institution, organized or unorganized actions of farmers and their lobbies will cause varying degrees of the negotiations, which are the fundamental incentive in China's rural tax and fee institution. And international agricultural products trade patterns and the evolution direction will constitute an external factors. When all the evidences show that the rural tax institution reform will bring benefits, the changes become inevitable.However, as we analyzed, it isn't possible for the farmers, the main beneficiaries to negotiate through normal efficient way during China's rural reform. Instead, their "negotiations" cost is high and devastating, and the means will be likely to affect the sustainable development of national economy and even national security. In this sense, it will also increase the cost of national negotiations. Therefore, rewarding the legitimate negotiations "identity" and reducing the costs of negotiations will also reduce negotiation costs. It's the primary conditions to smoothly advance China's rural reform and economic development.