The Study Of The Governance To Peasants' Opportunistic Behaviors In Contract Farming

The contract farming is a creative system to promote the reform of farm and sideline products to adapt to the market changes in the process of agricultural industrialization。It gets the access to connect the small household farmers and the large market and plays a key role in increasing farmers' income。In this article, through studying some cases and investigating and doing on-spot research of Jianong Firm in Shenzhen City, we have gotten the following conclusions as well as some concepts needing to be examined: (1) In contract farming, the governance to opportunistic behaviors among peasants includes not only explicit rules but also some implicit rules。The encouragement before happening, the control in the processing and the management afterwards have been fully showed in it。This completely indicates that the structure of governance in reality is very complex。 The common function of various rules and institutions makes peasants get more from not carrying out opportunistic behaviors than doing。Due to this, the efficient Nash equilibrium exceeding prisoners' dilemma comes into being。And a multiple-win situation has been achieved because of the cooperation of all the participators including the firm, agents and farmers。(2) It is a significant precondition of managing peasants successfully in the contract farming to put the controlling rights of production to the most capable agents or brokerages and realize the cooperation between them and the firm。(3) It will effectively help reduce the transaction cost of company and the agent or brokerages when managing peasants if they fully take advantage of the peasants' social capital。(4) The successful governance to the household fanners depends on the rules or institutions that can produce and allocate economic rent perfectly for each participator to satisfy the stake-holders'(the firm, the agents and the households) incentive compatibility constrain and participation constrain。...