Effects Of The Various Control Transferring Ways On Operating Performance Of Chinese Listed Companies

In the background of the special ownership structure of China, with the transfer of shares of listed companies and the resultant increase of the phenomenon of transferring and control, the control of listed companies have exposes a more and more problems gradually. Under this circumstance, control transferring is still a doubt whether it is able to improve the corporate operating performance.On the base of M&A and market for corporate control theory and makes a descriptive statistics of present guarantee characters in market for corporate control of China. This paper empirically analyze the changes of companies'operating performance before and after the transfer of corporate control cases that took place in A share market in china in 2002 by EVA index, according to the sample, we found out the companies'performance was not improved in ST Corporate, the operating performance of free allocation corporate and spending transfer to state-owned enterprise were increased in the first year, but the improvement was descent gradually; Relatively, the present value of transferring to private enterprise is lower than the sample, but it is applicable in examining the changes of the operating performance appreciably. This research have different reasons for the trend of diversification, further research paper is base on ownership structure, discusses the origin of external guarantee and its influence on the transfer of corporate control cases of listed companies from ownership form and ownership centralization by means of empirical method. We found out that the list corporate which transfer to state-owned enterprise is distinct in ownership structure from transferring to private enterprise and different ownership structure of the corporate will have different operating performance: the operating performance is not affected by the ratio of the state-owned shareholding and the domestic law persons shareholding; through the model we found that up to a certain threshold, companies'operating Performance decreases as government shareholding stake increase, but beyond this threshold, as government shareholding stake continue to increase, operating performance also begin to do so, while the trend of ownership centralization is increase first than decrease. That is means the ownership centralization is positive related with the state-owned enterprise and negative related with the private enterprise.