Voluntary Disclosure Behavior And The Vicissitude Of Information Regulation

The full effective information disclosure is the cornerstone of capital market's effective revolution, and the information disclosed by listed companies plays an important role in preventing securities fraudulent practices. From the angles of market and government, we discuss the voluntary disclosure of economic subjects and the mandatory disclosure behaviors under information regulation forces, in order to seek the vicissitude of modern capital market information regulation. We can probably regulate the accounting information better, and strengthen the controlling forces of government to the market, then maintain healthy development of the market economy.This thesis begins with the theory foundation of accounting information disclosure, and shows its function mechanism from the angle of information economics. As a signal transmission mechanism voluntary disclosure is an effective disclosure method. But managers' information disclosed quantity is restricted by the cost income principle, the spot at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost is the managers'most superior disclosure equilibrium point. Then, from the angle of behavior economics, this thesis analyzes that managers may not have enough motivation to supply voluntary information, and voluntary disclosure appears to be dissimilated. Managers' decision-making influenced by the custom and social model depends on the present situation in most cases, which attenuates the voluntary motivation. Moreover, the unknown investors and information fraud cause failure of the signal transmission mechanism. In this case, voluntary disclosure turns to be dissimilated. Precisely because of the dissimilation, voluntary disclosure starts transforming to the information regulation. Next, the thesis elaborates that mandatory disclosure could restrain companies'information disclosure with two aspects, internal company governance and external market forces. Then audits become the valid supplement mechanism of mandatory disclosure. But the government and audits are independent economic subjects, which have the motive to seek rents. They make up the new cheating union with managers. Information fraud problems have not been solved, and mandatory disclosure regulation appears to be dissimilated. Finally, this thesis proposes that it is necessary to govern fraud from the angle of law, and carry on the concrete analysis of counter-fraud law regulation through the case of Daqing lianyi. The counter-fraud law regulation bases on the angle of nomocracy, and all the economic subjects'behaviors are all under the governmental frame by law. Government's authority is restricted, so its motive to seek rents is weakened. Government behaviors could obtain adjustments. Moreover the latent legal punishment may reduce the managers'fraudulent motive, but also it is effective on auditor's information fraudulent practice. Therefore as a new information regulation way, the counter-fraud law regulation...