Study On Cause And Problems In Practice Of The SOEs' Bankruptcy By Policy

This paper mainly studied and discussed the bankruptcy by policy of state owned enterprises (SOEs) from two aspects of theory and practice.This paper used the soft budget constraint (SBC) theory and the exit theory to explain the causation of SOEs bankruptcy. It showed that the root of SOEs bankruptcy lies in low efficiency caused by SBC and the situation that the state can not go back on the recessive contract between the state and the SOEs. In fact, from the very begin, the SOEs were burdened with all kinds of mission, and so were consented no bankruptcy and no unemployment. This means that the state can not make the leads of SOEs enforce the contract efficiently by withdraw threatening, thus make the recessive contract becomes an insurance contract in which the state takes limitless responsibility. Therefore, the state will impossibly prevent its enterprises from decapitalization and low efficiency, as long as it can not allow the bankruptcy of SOEs and the unemployment of the works.In bankruptcy practice, some state owned industrial enterprises have more favorable policy bankruptcy process. Because their bankruptcy process will not according to bankruptcy law, it was called bankruptcy by policy. A lot of problem rise for no experience, therefore, it's very important to study and solve them and then to guide further stage of bankruptcy. Based on practice, this paper summarized these problems and brought forth some solving measures on assets valuation by using game theory. Also, this paper created a three-party game model to show collusion of local governor and SOEs, and then, brought forth some measures to prevent it. Finally, this paper gave some piece of policies on the bankruptcy by policy, and some expectations on the future development of the enterprise after recombination were made.