Research On The Reform Of Shareholdings Division About Chinese Listed Companies In The Institutional Economics Approach

The reform of shareholdings division in Chinese listed companies indicates institutional change of stock market. The dissertation analyzes shareholdings division reform from institutional economics' view. The reforming process of shareholdings division is the shareholders' gambling process. According to analysis, we conclude that the future of Chinese listed companies and stock market is institutional innovation. The stock market's standard operation is a long-term process, which cannot be solved by shareholdings division reform.According to Institutional Economics Theory, the main reason of shareholdings division reform is the imbalance of institutional supplies and demands. Shareholdings division is one of institutional disadvantages. The institutional change effect of shareholdings division reform has not covered completely till now. The pattern of institutional change shareholdings division reform chooses is the motivational transition way which Chinese government leads. A theoretical framework is made up to analyze the shareholdings division reform on the base.According to game theory, the stock market is in the typical game condition during the reforming process. This dissertation simply defines two sides of the game: liquid Shareholders and illiquid Shareholders and then constructs the game model and obtains the Pareto optimal solution. The author has also carried on the simple discussions to the third party or even more, which join the government.It is a long way for China stock market to come through the institutional changing process. A lasting institutional innovation is essential to support stock market development. Based on general analysis, the dissertation finally proposes some institutional innovation principles and main suggestions in the view of listed companies.