| Agency problems long existing makes boards as central concern of modern corporate governance. Corporate governance problems in China is especially prominent in the process of economic transition and have attracted many researchers home and aboard in recent years. Quite a lot of documents about China corporate governance have gone up, but the value of these outcomes is little mainly due to their problems too simple and lack of comparison. As thus, this thesis deals deeply with the activities of main body about boards governance based on the specification of main body of boards(larger shareholders,CEOS and independent directors ) from view of inside corporate governance . In the aspects of theory studies, the activism of large shareholder supervising CEO and the activism of himself(herself) is closely related with the development of exterior control markets. If residual claims allocated by share, independent directors incline to inspect the CEO; agency cost can't be eliminated because of the private income from control; In the aspects of empirical studies, this thesis regard our country listed company as the sample, with panel data analysis method, deals with the activities of main body about boards systematically. The activities of main body about boards changes with the nature of enterprise ownership and the condition of chairman CEO dulity. In present stage, the ownership structure balance and separation of chairman CEO dulity are valid paths to resolve the governance problems of state-owned business enterprises. The role of independent directors are comprehensive, which can't be treat in same manner, but over all its function is still in less. Whether a corporation is a stated-owned or run by private capital, the result of share incentive is implicit; finally, this thesis put forward correspondent suggestions about boards governance of our country listed company based on the research about theory and empirical analysis of boards activities. |
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