A Study Of Large Shareholders Expropriation In China's Listed Companies

In most countries in the world, a phenomenon that controlling shareholders expropriate corporate assets is very popular. In fact, the expropriation is more popular in China. Many people think it should be associated with ownership structure.Firstly, this paper describes the change of the background of controlling shareholder expropriation and reviews the measuring methods and empirical research of the controlling shareholder expropriation, makes simple remark on the research findings. Furthermore, we demonstrate the special ownership structure and corporate governance. Then sum up the approaches of the controlling shareholders expropriation, including borrowing contract and connected transaction.Then we analyze the internal and external condition of the expropriation behavior and explain the revision mechanism from the perspective of game theory.We conduct the empirical research of the expropriation behavior, mainly from the perspective of the cost of the controlling shareholder, the detailed statistics reflects controlling shareholder expropriate the interest of small shareholder by means of giving up stock allotment, high premium allotment and decrease of the future interest rate.The last is the suggestions, including improving the structure of the internal and external governance, gradually solving stock separations problem.