The Analysis And Optimization On The Economic Behavior Deviation Of China Local Governments

Local governments play a special and important role in the reform from planning economic system to market economy system in China. In this transformation process, the local government has always been the main variable which affects the local economy's normal development and growth. In the process of market-oriented reform, the strategies of decentralizing powers and surrender profits and the implementation of sharing-tax system arouse the local governments'enthusiasm of developing regional economy, and the relatively independent economic benefits'main body position local governments continues to be strengthened and consolidated. The local governments which take protecting local benefit as their responsibility are also expending their functions and remodeling their roles, and in some degree, it leads to the deviation of local governments'economy behaviors. Therefore, adjusting and optimizing local governments'functions and roles in a scientific and reasonable way are not only the inherent request of strengthening the central government's authority and the promoting the local governments'vitality, but also the necessary premise of the administrative system reform's success which aims to alter the governments'functions.From the agency perspective, this dissertation analyzed the characteristics and main performance of the local governments'economy behaviors'deviation based on synthetically applying the principles of administration, economics and management science, and summed up the deviation of local governments'economic behaviors in six areas : the government's short-term goal; the initiation of serving as the economic mainstay;the regional protectionism is in vogue;anti-macro-control behaviors;generalization administrative intervention, as well as the alienation of rent-seeking behavior. Local governments exist economy deviant behavior mainly for the imperfect incentive and restrictive mechanisms of the economic behaviors of local governments in China,The financial system aspect system supplies are unbalanced as well as the local authority economic activities lack of institutional support and the negative effects brought out by local governments'seeking maximizing benefits.Finally, this paper suggest to standardize and optimize the economic behaviors of local governments in China by establishing incentive and restrained mechanisms for local governments'economy behaviors, improving decentralized local government financial system and accelerating system innovation of local governments, and make it back to a rational state. The ultimate goal is to achieve a benign interaction between the central and local governments by orderly competition and co-operation, and to found a solid foundation for building a reunification healthy market system, and to support China's sustainable economic growth.