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Analysis Of Inside Governance Mechanism Impacting On Related Party Transactions In Listed Company

Posted on:2008-01-23Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J H WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360215495542Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the stock market developing and quantity of the listed company increasing, conflicts of interest arising from trades between related parties become increasingly serious. It is an impossibly evasive question how to solve the questions of related trades, for all investing parties, China Securities Regulatory Commission and the department establishing the accountant criterion.On the base of expounding company governance relevance theories, at first , This thesis has carried out analysis on the overall situation of related-party transactions in Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2004. taking Henan 31 listed companies as the sample, carries out detailed analysis on the forms of related-party transaction and has summed up four kind related-party transaction means which are commonly used by listed companies. Then, It takes 309 listed manufacturing industry listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the studying sample that have used related-party transactions in 2005. selects 11 company governing mechanism variables, applies One-way ANOVA and Multivariant Linearity regression analysis , have inspected whether the inside governing mechanisms are able to have an effect to restrain and cut down the related-party transactions.The research results show: four means of related-party transaction which are commonly used by Chinese listed companies and whose amount of money are bigger, whose effect are bigger are the related-party purchase, the related-party sell, the related-party guarantee, funds which are taken up by the related parties and controlling shareholders. It discovers that share equity structure influences related-party transactions strongly; The bigger scale of directors board can restrain related-party transactions happening; the more independent directors and the higher reward of them help to decrease related-party transactions; if chairman and general manager are two duty-in-one, the related-party transactions easily happen; and the supervision mechanism of supervisor board has certain effect ,but its effect is not notable ;at the same time ,the thesis finds managers don't improve corporate performance by related-party transactions; the creditors in our country can not participate in corporate governing actively, debts constraint mechanism did not give full play on the related-party transactions.So the thesis draws the advices from the improving of corporate inside governing mechanism and revealing sufficiently of the information. optimizing equity structure,perfecting board governing mechanism, playing sufficiently supervise function, building governing mechanism of managers and creditors can restrain unfair related-party transactions ,so the listed companies develop healthily.
Keywords/Search Tags:Listed Companies, Inside Governance, Related-party Transaction, Empirical Study
PDF Full Text Request
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