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Debt Financing And Corporate Goverance Of Listed Corporate

Posted on:2007-05-05Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X D ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360215968292Subject:Agricultural Economics and Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
MM model brought forward by Modigliani and Miller indicates that different style of financing isn't relative to firm value in perfect capital market. But due to the transaction cost in actual market, the hypothesis premise isn't accordant with the fact and financing decision-making couldn't be irrelative to firm value. Debt financing decision-making influences firm value and the allocation efficiency of social resources. The target of this article is to launch research on debt governance efficiency of listed companies from agent cost,information asymmetry,and product-market competition angles by using modern microeconomics theory such as information economics, principal-agent theory and non-perfect contract theory and combining basic knowledge of finance, management, political economics and law and using methods such as positive analysis, normal analysis and comparison analysis, and discuss the systems of relizing the debt governance role. The main viewpoints of are as follows: Financing structure has a symbiotic and mutual-reaction with corporate governance; Increasing the proportion of debt financing is the main way to reduce agent cost of equity financing contract,through reasonable arrangement of debt financing contracts, agent cost of debt financing contracts is reduced and total agent cost of financing contracts is also reduced; we find that the listed companies in china don't mitigate the under-and over-investment by financing policy,and is contrary to pecking order theory; The choice of the proportion of debt financing needs trade off between the product-market competition and financial leverage effect, industries in which the degree of competition is lower have higher proportion of debt financing ,and industries in which the degree of competition is higher have low financial leverage policy, by analysis, the characteristic of financial leverage of listed companies in china contradicts the above theory; legal protection of debtee is the basic guarantee to raise debt governance efficiency of listed companies. The effectiveness of legal protection of debtee is mainly determined by whether debtee'rights are involved in law, whether the way and relative law procedure exist and the executive quality of legal protection of debtee.
Keywords/Search Tags:Debt financing, Corporate governance, Agent cost, Information asymmetry, Product-market competition
PDF Full Text Request
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