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Research On The Allocation Of Venture Enterprises' Controlling Rights In Venture Investment In China

Posted on:2008-10-02Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H H AnFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360215989395Subject:Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Research on venture enterprises'control rights is the core of research on the venture capital investment micro-governing. Currently, the allocation research of venture enterprises'control rights is carried out under the frame of Principle-Agent theory. But it doesn't accord with the reality. In fact, from the actual process of Venture Capital investment,the relationship between venture entrepreneur and venture capitalist is not just the relationship of principle and agent ,but the relationship in the frame of cooperative game theory. So the improvement of the relationship between venture entrepreneur and venture capitalist should be adopt for the research can be corresponded with the actual needs.Firstly, the thesis defines the concept of venture capital investment and venture enterprise .And then it point out the way of future development of venture capital investment in China by comparison with the way of development of venture capital investment in America.Of course, the allocation of controlling rights in Venture enterprise is very different from the allocation in common enterprise. By compare with these, the thesis gets out the unique of controlling rights allocation in Venture enterprise, the same while, it gets out a clearly definition of controlling rights in Venture enterprise. Finally , the thesis achieved a new inresearching idea after comparing the merits and drawbacks of several typical models and theories in the allocation of controlling rights in Venture enterprise.The thesis investigates the relationship of venture entrepreneur and venture capitalist on the background of cooperative game theory. With some reasonable conditions and the binomial tree model, venture entrepreneur and venture capitalist arrange different strategy of control rights allocation in each stage to maximize their interests. Next, a new mathematical model is brought forward to consider the risk of venture enterprise and fixed quality flexibly comprehensively by using binomial Vasicek model under the frame of cooperative game theory. Finally, the theory and mathematical model is certified by a three stage venture investment case with Matlab software. The results and analysis are proved the right and rationality of new viewpoints in the thesis.
Keywords/Search Tags:Allocation of Controlling, Venture Capital, Venture Enterprise, Cooperative Game Theory, Real Option
PDF Full Text Request
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